Based on different concepts of nation-states, the article tries to demonstrate through the analysis of decisions of national courts that despite the same wording of the constitutional text, supreme and constitutional courts may come to totally differing conclusions in light of the constitutional history and doctrine of the respective country. The first pan of the article gives an overview on case-law denying effective participation through non-recognition of ethnic diversity as a legal category, for instance through the ban of the formation of political parties along ethnic lines or through interpretative pre emption of the legal status of minority groups. The second part of the article gives an overview of vari ous legal mechanisms in order to enable, support, or even guarantee the representation and process-oriented effective participation of minorities in elected bodies, such as exemptions from thresh old requirements in elections or reserved seats in parliament, and through cultural and territorial self government regimes in those constitutional systems which legally recognize ethnic diversity. Nevertheless, the case-law demonstrates how difficult it remains to reconcile the notion of "effectiveness" with a posi tivistic and formal-reductionist understanding of terms such as equality, sovereignty, people or nation. The Lund Recommendations have served as an important guideline for a new, "communitarian" under standing of "effective" participation so that the author argues in conclusion that it requires more intra and inter-disciplinary dialogue between law, politics and (legal) philosophy as well as between national and international minority protection mechanisms to "constitutionalize" this philosophy.
Introduction
When trying to analyze the case law of national courts regarding effective partici pation of national minorities in public life, the qualification "effective" in any case requires a functional analysis of law in order to be able to assess the effect, in other words, the result of legal instruments designed by law-makers for the pur pose of participation of minorities. Therefore, a functional analysis must also take the "context" of decisions and rulings of courts into account which is very often not openly addressed in the text of the operative part and/or reasoning of a judgment. This context is very often determined by ideological and political traditions developed over decades or even centuries which are crystallized in con stitutional "doctrines" which form the great mass of the ice-berg in the shallow water under the tip of the visible and readable text of constitutional law.
Such doctrines are of particular relevance for minority protection mechanisms.
In a nutshell, French and German political tradition and constitutional doctrine represent in an almost ideal-typical way two opposing models of nation-states. The "state-nation" had transformed "peasants into Frenchmen"' based on the inter-play between two basic constitutional principles: the concept of strictly individual equality before the law and the concept of national sovereignty, com plementing the principle of popular sovereignty. However, this constitutional doctrine of an ethnically "indifferent" state-nation does not recognize ethnic diversity as a social phenomenon and its legal institutionalization as an instru ment of conflict regulation, in particular by the possible legal instrument of group rights on behalf of minorities.2
In contrast, the model of the "ethnicized" national state, which has its ideologi cal roots in the writings of philosophers of German idealism, is normatively based on the so-called "nationality principle": a "people" is formed according to so called "objective" criteria such as a "common" language, religion or the belief in a common history or culture with a "natural" right to found its own state. Since an ethnically conceived nation is based on the categorical division into a "majority" population, usually "identified" with the ethnic nation-state,3, and "others" who, because of this cultural "otherness", are categorized as "ethnic or national minori ties", the principle of equality before the law has a rather different meaning for persons either belonging to the majority population or to a minority. "Others", simply by belonging to the wrong group, are never equal in practice.
In conclusion, even the idea of "minority protection" and their integration into society makes only sense if the problem is taken seriously in the development of any constitutional theory and doctrine of how to reconcile the normative prin ciple of equality with the social fact of ethnic diversity of societies as a problem of democratic governance. Hence, Francesco Palermo and Jens Woelk differentiated four models: the "repressive nationalist state", based on the fiction of ethnic homogeneity and thus suppressing all ethnic diversity, the "agnostic liberal nation state", which is "indifferent" to ethnic diversity, the "national state of multinational and promotional aspiration", which is characterized by the predominance of a national group vis-à-vis one or several recognized and protected minority groups, and the "paritarian multinational state", which aims at integration and reflection of the multicultural society on a paritarian basis through territorial and/or insti tutional arrangements.4
Moreover, as can be seen from the developments at the international level since Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of 1999. This shift of the para digm and the incorporation of international law into domestic law is a long process, very often contested before national courts about the dogmatically "correct" interpretation of very often vague constitutional provisions based on "concepts" such as "democracy", "rule of law", "sovereignty", "equality", "people" or "nation." It follows from provisions such as Articles 4 and 15 of the FCNM and in the same way from the general principles of the Lund Recommendations that not only (individual) equality before the law but "full and effective equality" as well as "effective participation" together with the notion of a group-oriented promotion of national minorities' identities and cultures are seen as "the three corners of a triangle which together form the main foundations"5 not only of the Framework Convention as the recently published Thematic Commentary explains, but of the entire new paradigm of conflict resolution through diversity management. Thus national courts would be required to interpret constitutional provisions no longer only with regard to the literal meaning of the text, but more from a process-and result-oriented approach6 by taking also the "context" into account as will be demonstrated in the following analysis. To begin with the worst case against the values enshrined in the Lund Recom mendations: ethnic cleansing7 is either an instrument of warfare or an effect of violent ethnic conflicts. It goes without saying that violent attacks such as killing, torture, raping or taking of hostages going hand in hand with the actual expul sion of persons from the territory or in order to make them flee of fear of such acts are criminally liable acts both under public international criminal law and national criminal law.8 What is, however, of concern for the topic of this paper is the question whether there is a legal responsibility of state authorities to combat ethnic cleansing and to reverse its effects.
This problem was the context of the so-called "constituent peoples" case U 5/98 of the Bosnian Constitutional Court.9 In the framework of an abstract review procedure the Court had to establish the meaning of the phrase "constituent peo ples" in order to determine whether both Articles 1 of the constitutions of the Entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina are unconstitutional. I have commented this decision in detail elsewhere.10 In short, the Court had two options. The first was to uphold the "historic compromise" concluded at Dayton in 1995, with its ter ritorial separation and institutional homogenization of Entity institutions along ethnic lines through a historic interpretation of the meaning of the relevant provi sions, thereby constitutionally legitimizing past ethnic cleansing and the ongoing ethnic homogenization of Entity institutions based on exclusion. The second option was to rely on the other constitutionally entrenched and "dynamic" goal of the General Framework Agreement for Peace, namely the return of refugees and displaced persons in order to re-establish a multiethnic society as it had existed before the war through a functional interpretation of the constitutional system. After the Constitutional Court had established itself the facts of ongoing dis crimination and segregation on the ground, the Court -in a narrow five to four decision -took the second option and declared both Articles 1 of the Entity supra note 2, pp. 45-61 which cornes to the same conclusion in regard to the "essence" of the Lund Recommendations. constitutions unconstitutional. In a nutshell, the Court argued that "the collec tive equality of constituent peoples following from the designation of Bosnians, Croats and Serbs as constituent peoples prohibits any special privilege for one or two of these peoples, any domination in governmental structures, or any ethnic homogenisation through segregation based on territorial separation"."
The explicit requirement to effectively combat and reverse the effects of ethnic cleansing was also ruled out in cases U 15/9912 and U 16/00.13 A minority organization in Poland, claiming to represent a "Silesian" minority, wanted to be registered as a national minority. This was, however, refused by the Polish authorities with the argument that they cannot be registered as a national minority since there is no such "nation or nationality" in Poland and recom mended the claimants to ask for registration as a cultural association, which they refused. The Polish higher courts then took this as evidence that they wanted to obtain, under false pretence, the electoral privilege of the exemption from the five per cent threshold requirement foreseen under the electoral law for parties of national minorities. As can be seen from this reasoning, state authorities, even if these are independent courts, are given unlimited discretionary power to decide on the "existence" of a national minority without prior constitutional clarifica tion and thereby the possibility to pre-empt the exercise of the guaranteed right to political participation. In light of its former case law with regard to the "margin of appreciation" of national authorities, it was therefore astonishing that the ECtHR upheld this decision of the Polish Supreme Court in Gorzelik v. Finally, also in a "state of promotional inspiration" such as Austria, the determi nation of legal standing of persons belonging to national minorities or minority groups before courts for the necessary decision on the admissibility of the claim can lead to a more or less total pre-emption of minority rights with regard to effective legal remedies as a necessary requirement for effective participation as ity claimed the establishment of bi-lingual place name signs at the municipality boundaries which mark the beginning and the end of the territory of that munic ipality and thereby also a speed-limit for traffic. The Constitutional Court, how ever, denied the admissibility of these claims with the argument that neither persons belonging to the minority nor groups representing the minority have a "subjective" right on bilingual place names or other topographical indications according to Article 7(3) of the Austrian State Treaty. In light of the previous minority-friendly decisions of the Constitutional Court, thereby correcting the inaction of the legislature and executive to effectively guarantee the rights follow ing from Article 7 of the State Treaty, this ruling was quite a surprise. But as can be seen from the reasoning, the argumentation in this case followed the constitu tional doctrine of the so-called Viennese school of legal positivism which strictly divides "objective" law and "subjective" rights. The former confers, at best, obli gations on state authorities, but no rights including legal standing for persons or legal entities before courts. Against previous decisions of the Constitutional Court with regard to language rights in primary and secondary public education as well as before administrative and judicial authorities according to Article 7(2) and (3), in which the Constitutional Court had struck down the argumentation of the government that these provisions do not grant rights, but are only positive obliga tions, the Court this time followed these arguments and declared the provision prescribing bi-lingual place names and other topographical indications to be "objective" law.29
The same formalistic approach of legal positivism can also be seen from two decisions of the Austrian Administrative Court, which is, in addition to the Supreme and Constitutional Court, one of the three "supreme" courts in Austria. However, these legal instruments providing for representation will not necessarily decide the degree of (procedural) influence on decision-making processes within these bodies and their outcomes, i.e., participation in the more narrow sense of process-and result-orientation. Again from an ideal-typical point of view, the procedural role of legal instruments for participation in this sense may be put on a continuum between mere observer status or consultation towards unlimited veto-power. It goes without saying that all "special" measures for effective partici pation characterize the "state of promotional inspiration" and multi-national states, but not without problems raised in their implementation as can be seen in the following from the analysis of the case law of national courts. As far as the right to vote and to stand as candidate in elections as the fundamen tal political right in every democratic regime is concerned, there is the problem of "vote dilution" in order to use this term coined by the US Supreme Court, i.e. that the individual votes cast do not have the same "weight" for gaining a seat in elected bodies. Such a dilution is the effect of the majority vote system as such.
Moreover, the sub-division of the national territory into two or more electoral districts is usually used as a technique for negative or positive discrimination in such systems. Vote dilution is also an effect, albeit to a much lesser extent, in the proportional vote system (PR), in particular if threshold requirements are intro duced. The central concern of minority protection, but also democratic theory and constitutional doctrine, is thus the question whether it is necessary and, if this is the case, how to overcome the disproportionate effects of electoral mecha nisms for minorities in order to achieve not only formal, procedural equality of voting rights, but also "full and effective equality" in the language of Article 4 of the FCNM.
It goes without saying that the exclusion from the fundamental right to vote is prima facie a violation of the democratic principle, but the direct or indirect exclusion from the active or passive right to vote can happen even in a "state of promotional aspiration" and a multi-national state, as can be seen from the fol lowing case-law. exclusionary mechanisms from the right to stand as a candidate in elections can not properly be understood as strict individual rights of persons without taking a group-oriented dimension into account, i.e. that individuals do not exercise rights in an "abstract way" but on behalf of group formation and the representation of interests of groups. The same holds true for the notion of "full and effective equal ity" which cannot be evaluated without taking into account the underlying cate gories or groups such as age, gender, or belonging to a national minority, for the necessary point of comparison. All "special measures" on behalf of minorities with regard to representation and participation thus raise the problem inhowfar group-orientation is considered a legitimate aim under the auspices of equal vot ing rights.
Thus, in a next step on the scale from the strict individual right to vote towards proportional representation we will find the problem whether there is not only a right to vote for any of the parties or candidates participating in the electoral competition, but also a right to "vote for a candidate of one's choice", to take up again the phrase from the US Supreme Court, i.e. that there is also a "specific" right to be able to cast a vote for a party or candidate who is representing a par ticular national minority. The Austrian Constitutional Court has explicitly denied such a right to vote for a candidate of one's choice or a right to ethnic representa tion in elected bodies in a decision in 1981. The Koroska Enotna Lista, a political party representing the Slovene minority in the Austrian Land Carinthia, had brought a claim against the general elections for the Parliament of this Land after having failed to gain a seat under a PR system with a "natural" threshold due to the division of the Land into several electoral districts which had split up the settlement area of this minority. They claimed to be discriminated against by this drawing of boundaries of electoral districts and that the Slovene minority has a right to "ethnic representation" in the Land Parliament. Both claims were rejected by the Court.37
Exemptions from Thresholds
As can also be seen from the decision of the European Commission on Human Rights in Lindsay and Others v. UK,is a PR system is generally considered to be more favourable for the representation of minorities in elected bodies. However, in order to guarantee political stability, in particular stable governments, very became clear due to the demographic and economic developments that it would no longer be able to win a seat even under this lower threshold requirement. In the second decision,42 however, the German Constitutional Court rejected this request for an exemption from the threshold requirement by arguing that, "first, the constitutionally entrenched equality principle is not violated, if the legislator does not make a distinction, which it could make; second, the character of a political party in representing a national minority does not constitute an essential difference which has to be taken into consideration by the legislator in the design of the rights of political parties in the electoral process".43 In conclusion, the Court thereby established, first, the doctrine -as already discussed above -that there is no right to ethnic representation and, second, that the legislator can make an exemption without violating the equality principle, but is not required to do so. 
